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Should mentalistic concepts be defended or assumed?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

E. W. Menzel Jr.
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, N.Y. 11794
Garcia K. Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, N.Y. 11794

Abstract

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

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