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The strengths of – and some of the challenges for – Bayesian models of cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Thomas L. Griffiths
Thomas L. Griffiths
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1650. tom_griffiths@berkeley.eduhttp://cocosci.berkeley.edu
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Abstract

Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford & Chater 2007) illustrates the strengths of Bayesian models of cognition: the systematicity of rational explanations, transparent assumptions about human learners, and combining structured symbolic representation with statistics. However, the book also highlights some of the challenges this approach faces: of providing psychological mechanisms, explaining the origins of the knowledge that guides human learning, and accounting for how people make genuinely new discoveries.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 89 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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