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Thinking and believing in self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Kent Bach
Kent Bach
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132 kbach@sfsu.edu
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Abstract

Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 105
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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