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Aiming at self-deception: Deflationism, intentionalism, and biological purpose

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

David Livingstone Smith
David Livingstone Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of New England, Biddeford, ME 04005. dsmith@une.eduhttp://realhumanature.com
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Abstract

Deflationists about self-deception understand self-deception as the outcome of biased information processing, but in doing so, they lose the normative distinction between self-deception and wishful thinking. Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) advocate a deflationist approach, but they also want preserve the purposive character of self-deception. A biologically realistic analysis of deception can eliminate the contradiction implicit in their position.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 37 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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