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The case for cognitive penetrability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

Philippe G. Schyns
Philippe G. Schyns
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RTS Scotlandphilippe@psy.gla.ac.uk www.gla.ac.uk/Acad/Psychology/
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Abstract

Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , June 1999 , pp. 394 - 395
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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