Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T15:53:15.187Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Consciousness and the “causal paradox”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Max Velmans
Max Velmans
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, LondonSE14 6NW, United Kingdom, m.velmans@gold.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity. Viewed from a third-person perspective, however, consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains – producing a“causal paradox.” To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first-and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 19 , Special Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 538 - 542
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Baars, B. J. (1988) A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press. [SSR”Google Scholar
Baars, B. J. (1991) A curious coincidence? Consciousness as an object of scientific scrutiny fits our personal experience remarkably well. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):669–670. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baars, B. J. & Banks, N. P. (1992) On returning to consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 1:1–2. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baars, B. J. & McGovern, K. (1996) Cognitive views of consciousness: What are the facts? How can we explain them? In: The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews, ed. Velmans, M.. Routledge. “MV”Google Scholar
Bechtel, W. (1988) Philosophy of mind: An overview for cognitive science. Erlbaum. “SSR”Google Scholar
Block, N. (1991) Evidence against epiphenomenalism. Beliavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):670–672. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowers, K. S. (1991) (Un)conscious influences in everyday life and cognitive research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):672–673. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200–219. “MV”Google Scholar
Glicksohn, J. (1993) Putting consciousness in a box: Once more around the track. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(2):404. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gray, J. (1995) The contents of consciousness: A neurophysiological conjecture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(4):659–676. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenwald, A. G. (1992) Conscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist 47:766–779. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardcastle, V. G. (1991) Epiphenomenalism and the reduction of experience. Behavioral arid Brain Sciences 14(4):680. “MV]CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacoby, L. L., Lindsay, D. S. & Toth, J. P. (1992) Unconscious influences revealed: Attention, awareness and control. American Psychologist 47:802–809. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Leibniz, G. W. (1686) Discourse of Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology. Trans, by Ginsberg, M.. Allen & Unwin, 1923. “MV”Google Scholar
Lewicki, P. Hill, T., & Czyzewska, M. (1992) Nonconscious acquisition of information. American Psychologist, 47:796–801. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mandler, G. (1991) The processing of information is not conscious, but its products often are. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):688–689. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merikle, P. M. (1992) Perception without awareness: Critical issues. American Psychologist, 47:766–766. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Neumann, O. (1984) Automatic processing: A review of recent findings and a plea for an old theory. In Prinz, W. & Sanders, A. F. (eds.), Cognition and motor processes. Springer Verlag. “SSR”Google Scholar
Palmer, S. E. & Kimchi, R. (1986) The information processing approach to cognition. In Knapp, T. & Robertson, L. C. (eds.), Approaches to cognition: Contrasts and controversies. Erlbaum. “SSR”Google Scholar
Rakover, S. S. (1990) Metapsychology: Missing links in behavior, mind and science. Paragon/Solomon. “SSR”Google Scholar
Rey, G. (1991) Reasons for doubting the existence even of epiphenomenal consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):691–692. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shallice, T. (1988) Information-processing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In Marrel, A. J. & Bisiach, E. (eds.). Consciousness in contemporary science. Clarendon Press. “SSR]Google Scholar
Shanks, D. R. & St. John, M. F. (1994) Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17:3, 367–394. “SSR”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheikh, A. A., Kunzendorf, R. G. & Sheikh, K. S. (1996) Somatic consequences of consciousness. In: The science of consciousness: Psychological, neuropsychological, and clinical reviews, ed. Velmans, M.. Routledge. “MV”Google Scholar
Sloman, A. (1991) Developing concepts of consciousness. Beiiavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):694–695. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solso, L. R. (1991) Cognitive Psychology, 3 ed. Allyn & Bacon. “SSR”Google Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (1991) Damn! There goes that ghost again! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):696–698. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Underwood, G. (1991) Attention is necessary for word integration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):698. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velmans, M. (1991a) Is human information processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):651–669. “MV, SSR”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velmans, M. (1991b) Consciousness from a first-person perspective. Beiiavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):702–726. “MV, SSR”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velmans, M. (1993) Consciousness, causality and complementarity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(2):409–416. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velmans, M. (1995a) The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(4):702. “MV”CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velmans, M. (1995b) The relation of consciousness to the material world. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):255–265. “MV”Google Scholar
Wilson, T. D. (1991) Consciousness: Limited but consequential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4):701. “MV]CrossRefGoogle Scholar