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Could phenomenal consciousness function as a cognitive unconscious?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2003

Max Velmans
Max Velmans
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, London, SE14 6NW, United Kingdomm.velmans@gold.ac.uk http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/departments/psychology/velmans.htm
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Abstract

Evidence for unconscious semantic representation suggests that a cognitive unconscious exists. Phenomenal consciousness cannot easily be shown to deal with complex cognitive operations such as those involved in language translation and creativity. A self-organising phenomenal consciousness that controls brain functions also runs into mind/body problems (well recognised in the consciousness studies literature) that Perruchet & Vinter must address.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , June 2002 , pp. 357 - 358
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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