Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T16:56:42.036Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Differential focus in causal and counterfactual thinking: Different possibilities or different functions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

David R. Mandel
David R. Mandel
Affiliation:
Defence Research and Development Canada (Toronto), Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9, Canada. David.Mandel@drdc-rddc.gc.cahttp://mandel.socialpsychology.org/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In The Rational Imagination, Byrne proposes a mental models account of why causal and counterfactual thinking often focus on different antecedents. This review critically examines the two central propositions of her account, finding both only weakly defensible. Byrne's account is contrasted with judgment dissociation theory, which offers a functional explanation for differences in the focus of causal and counterfactual thinking.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 460 - 461
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Byrne, R. M. J. (2005) The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collingwood, R. G. (1940) An essay on metaphysics. Clarendon.Google Scholar
Einhorn, H. J. & Hogarth, R. M. (1986) Judging probable cause. Psychological Bulletin 99:3–19.Google Scholar
Friedrich, J. (1993) Primary error detection and minimization (PEDMIN) strategies in social cognition: A reinterpretation of confirmation bias phenomena. Psychological Review 100:298–319.Google Scholar
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review 109:646–78.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Klayman, J. & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review 94:211–28.Google Scholar
Mandel, D. R. (2003b) Effect of counterfactual and factual thinking on causal judgments. Thinking and Reasoning 9:245–65.Google Scholar
Mandel, D. R. (2003c) Judgment dissociation theory: An analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual, and covariational reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:419–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mandel, D. R. (2005) Counterfactual and causal explanation: From early theoretical views to new frontiers. In: The psychology of counterfactual thinking, ed. Mandel, D. R., Hilton, D. J. & Catellani, P., pp. 11–23. Routledge.Google Scholar
Mandel, D. R. & Lehman, D. R. (1996) Counterfactual thinking and ascriptions of cause and preventability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71:450–63.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mandel, D. R. & Lehman, D. R. (1998) Integration of contingency information in judgments of cause, covariation, and probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 127:269–85.Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1956) Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review 63:129–38.Google Scholar
Wolff, P. (2007) Representing causation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 136:82–111.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed