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Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

Joëlle Proust
Joëlle Proust
Affiliation:
Institut Jean-Nicod CNRS (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Ecole Normale Supérieure), 75007 Paris, France; and Max-Planck Institut Für Psychologische Forschung, Münich, Germany jproust@ehess.fr http://joelle.proust.free.fr
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Abstract

Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , June 2003 , pp. 352
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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