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Epistemological missing links

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Terry Dartnall
Terry Dartnall
Affiliation:
Computing and Information Technology, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia 4116 terryd@cit.gu.edu.au
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Abstract

Clark & Thornton's “superficially distinct ploys and mechanisms” are in fact very different: there is a deep difference between (a) filters and feature detectors, which “let the information in,” and (b) contentful representations and theories, which reconfigure it into a computationally tractable form. (a) is bringing abilities to experience whereas (b) is bringing content to experience. Both have well known problems. I outline an evolutionary story that avoids these problems and begins to explain how representations and theories developed out of feature detectors and filters.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 70 - 71
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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