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The evolution of analytic thought?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 August 2017

Gordon Pennycook  and
David G. Rand
Gordon Pennycook
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205gordon.pennycook@yale.edudavid.rand@yale.eduhttps://gordonpennycook.nethttps://davidrand-cooperation.com
David G. Rand
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205gordon.pennycook@yale.edudavid.rand@yale.eduhttps://gordonpennycook.nethttps://davidrand-cooperation.com
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Abstract

We argue that the truly unique aspect of human intelligence is not the variety of cognitive skills that are ontogenetically constructed, but rather the capacity to decide when to develop and apply said skills. Even if there is good evidence for g in nonhuman animals, we are left with major questions about how the disposition to think analytically can evolve.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e215
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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