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Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Elinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom
Affiliation:
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408. ostrom@indiana.eduhttp://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/
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Abstract

Guala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 33 - 34
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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