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Explaining more by drawing on less

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Ulrike Hahn
Ulrike Hahn
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3AT, United Kingdom. hahnu@Cardiff.ac.uk
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Abstract

One of the most striking features of “Bayesian rationality” is the detail with which behavior on logical reasoning tasks can now be predicted and explained. This detail is surprising, given the state of the field 10 to 15 years ago, and it has been brought about by a theoretical program that largely ignores consideration of cognitive processes, that is, any kind of internal behavior that generates overt responding. It seems that an increase in explanatory power can be achieved by restricting a psychological theory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 90 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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