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Explicit knowledge in dolphins?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Eduardo Mercado  and
Scott O. Murray
Eduardo Mercado
Affiliation:
Center for Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience, Rutgers University-Newark Campus, Newark, NJ 07102 mercado@pavlov.rutgers.edu www.cmbn.rutgers.edu/~mercado/welcome.html
Scott O. Murray
Affiliation:
Institute of Theoretical Dynamics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616 smurray@itd.ucdavis.edu itd.ucdavis.edu/~murray
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Abstract

The theoretical framework proposed by Dienes & Perner sets the wrong standards for knowledge to be considered explicit. Animals other than humans possess knowledge, too, some of which is probably explicit. We argue that a comparative approach to investigating knowledge is likely to be more fruitful than one based on linguistic constructs and unobservable phenomena.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 774 - 775
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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