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Importing social preferences across contexts and the pitfall of over-generalization across theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Anne C. Pisor  and
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Anne C. Pisor
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210. pisor@umail.ucsb.eduhttp://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~pisor/
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution, and Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553. dfessler@anthro.ucla.eduhttp://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fessler
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Abstract

Claims regarding negative strong reciprocity do indeed rest on experiments lacking established external validity, often without even a small “menu of options.” Guala's review should prompt strong reciprocity proponents to extend the real-world validity of their work, exploring the preferences participants bring to experiments. That said, Guala's approach fails to differentiate among group selection approaches and glosses over cross-cultural variability.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 34 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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