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Is the world in the brain, or the brain in the world?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2004

Max Velmans
Max Velmans*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, New Cross, LondonSE14 6NW, United Kingdomhttp://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/departments/psychology/staff/velmans.html
*
m.velmans@gold.ac.uk
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Abstract:

Lehar provides useful insights into spatially extended phenomenology that may have major consequences for neuroscience. However, Lehar's biological naturalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions, and he does not give an accurate account of preceding and competing work. This commentary compares Lehar's analysis with that of Velmans, which addresses similar issues but draws opposite conclusions. Lehar argues that the phenomenal world is in the brain and concludes that the physical skull is beyond the phenomenal world. Velmans argues that the brain is in the phenomenal world and concludes that the physical skull is where it seems to be.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , August 2003 , pp. 427 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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References

Notes

1. Details are given in an unabridged version of this commentary (Velmans 2003).

2. The position of the image relative to the plate, for example, changes slightly as the observer moves around the plate. Nevertheless, the image is sufficiently clear for the observer to (roughly) measure its width and how far it projects in front of the plate (e.g., with a ruler).