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The nature and plausibility of Cognitivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

John Haugeland
John Haugeland
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
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Abstract

Cognitivism in psychology and philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal “cognitive processes,” that is, rational thought in a very broad sense. Sections 1 to 5 attempt to explicate in detail the nature of the scientific enterprise that this intuition has inspired. That enterprise is distinctive in at least three ways: It relies on a style of explanation which is different from that of mathematical physics, in such a way that it is not basically concerned with quantitative equational laws; the states and processes with which it deals are “interpreted,” in the sense that they are regarded as meaningful or representational; and it is not committed to reductionism, but is open to reduction in a form different from that encountered in other sciences. Spelling these points out makes it clear that the Cognitivist study of the mind can be rigorous and empirical, despite its unprecedented theoretical form. The philosophical explication has another advantage as well: It provides a much needed framework for articulating questions about whether the Cognitivist approach is right or wrong. The last three sections take that advantage of the account, and address several such questions, pro and con.

Keywords

explanationcognitioninformation processingreductionmethodologycomputer modelsphilosophy of science
Type
Target Article
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 215 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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