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Not different kinds, just special cases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

David Danks
David Danks
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University and Institute for Human & Machine Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. ddanks@cmu.eduhttp://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/faculty-danks.php
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Abstract

Machery's Heterogeneity Hypothesis depends on his argument that no theory of concepts can account for all the extant reliable categorization data. I argue that a single theoretical framework based on graphical models can explain all of the behavioral data to which this argument refers. These different theories of concepts thus (arguably) correspond to different special cases, not different kinds.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 208 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Danks, D. (2004) Psychological theories of categorization as probabilistic models. Technical report CMU-PHIL-157. July 15, 2004.Google Scholar
Danks, D. (2007) Theory unification and graphical models in human categorization. In: Causal learning: Psychology, philosophy, and computation, ed. Gopnik, A. & Schulz, L., pp. 173–89. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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