Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-g4j75 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-15T13:58:12.972Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Keith Gibbins
Keith Gibbins
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6155 Australiagibbons@socs.murdoch.edu.au
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 115 - 116
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)