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The person as moralist account and its alternatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Joshua Knobe
Joshua Knobe
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science and Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8306. joshua.knobe@yale.eduhttp://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/
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Abstract

The commentators offer helpful suggestions at three levels: (1) explanations for the particular effects discussed in the target article; (2) implications of those effects for our understanding of the role of moral judgment in human cognition; and (3) more theoretical questions about the overall relationship between ordinary cognition and systematic science. The present response takes up these three issues in turn.

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 353 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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