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Putting semantics back into the semantic representation of living things

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2001

Deborah Zaitchik  and
Gregg E. A. Solomon
Deborah Zaitchik
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA 02114 zaitchik@psych.mgh.harvard.edu
Gregg E. A. Solomon
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 geas@psyche.mit.edu
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Abstract

The authors' model reduces the literature on conceptual representation to a single node: “encyclopedic knowledge.” The structure of conceptual knowledge is not so trivial. By ignoring the phenomena central to reasoning about living things, the authors base their dismissal of semantic systems on inadequate descriptive ground. A better descriptive account is available in the conceptual development literature. Neuropsychologists could import the insights and tasks from cognitive development to improve their studies.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , June 2001 , pp. 496 - 497
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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