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Scaling the metaphorical brick wall

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Michael Bradie
Michael Bradie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403 mbradie@bgnet.bgsu.edu
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Abstract

Palmer argues that functionalist accounts of the mind are radically incomplete in virtue of a “metaphorical brick wall” that precludes a complete treatment of qualia. I argue that functionalists should remain unmoved by this line of argument to the effect that their accounts fail to do justice to some “intrinsic” features of experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 947 - 948
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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