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Self-deception and the desire to believe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Ariela Lazar
Ariela Lazar
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2155 lazar@csli.stanford.edu
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Abstract

This commentary concentrates on two flaws in Mele's account. The first is Mele's attempt to account for self-deception by appealing to a desire to believe, together with an instrumental belief concerning the means of satisfying this desire. Contrary to Mele, it is argued that such an account requires a recognition on the part of agents that their actions instantiate these means. Second, Mele misidentifies the most essential – and flawed – ingredient of the standard approach to self-deception, the agent's desire to form the belief (the belief that is undermined by the evidence). This ingredient is retained in Mele's own account of self-deception.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 119 - 120
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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