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Semantic redintegration: Ecological invariance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2008

Stephen E. Robbins
Stephen E. Robbins
Affiliation:
Center for Advanced Product Engineering, Metavante Corporation, Milwaukee, WI 53224. Stephen.Robbins@metavante.comstephenerobbins.com
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Abstract

In proposing that their model can operate in the concrete, perceptual world, Rogers & McClelland (R&M) have not done justice to the complexities of the ecological sphere and its invariance laws. The structure of concrete events forces a different framework, both for retrieval of events and concepts defined across events, than that upon which the proposed model, rooted in essence in the verbal learning tradition, implicitly rests.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 6 , December 2008 , pp. 726 - 727
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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