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Sidestepping the semantics of “consciousness”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Michael V. Antony
Michael V. Antony*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa31905, Israel
*
antony@research.haifa.ac.il
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Abstract

Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term “consciousness.” However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that “consciousness” is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of “consciousness.”

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 289 - 290
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Commentary on Ned Block (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. BBS 18(2): 227–287.