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The social costs of punishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Pieter van den Berg ,
Lucas Molleman  and
Franz J. Weissing
Pieter van den Berg
Affiliation:
Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, 9700 CC Groningen, The Netherlands. pieter.van.den.berg@rug.nll.s.molleman@rug.nlf.j.weissing@rug.nlhttp://www.rug.nl/fmns-research/theobio
Lucas Molleman
Affiliation:
Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, 9700 CC Groningen, The Netherlands. pieter.van.den.berg@rug.nll.s.molleman@rug.nlf.j.weissing@rug.nlhttp://www.rug.nl/fmns-research/theobio
Franz J. Weissing
Affiliation:
Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, 9700 CC Groningen, The Netherlands. pieter.van.den.berg@rug.nll.s.molleman@rug.nlf.j.weissing@rug.nlhttp://www.rug.nl/fmns-research/theobio
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Abstract

Lab experiments on punishment are of limited relevance for understanding cooperative behavior in the real world. In real interactions, punishment is not cheap, but the costs of punishment are of a different nature than in experiments. They do not correspond to direct payments or payoff deductions, but they arise from the repercussions punishment has on social networks and future interactions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 42 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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