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Some sceptical thoughts about metacognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

Derek Browne
Derek Browne
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand derek.browne@canterbury.ac.nz http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/derek_browne/
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Abstract

Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is often thought. Differences between cognitive states often come down to differences in their intentional contents. For that reason, differences in behaviour are often explained by differences just in contents of first-order states. Uncertainty need not be a metacognitive condition. First-order interpretations of the target experiments are available.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , June 2003 , pp. 340 - 341
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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