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Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion

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Commentary onCopnikAlison (1993) How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. BBS 16:1–14.
Commentary onGoldmanAlvin I. (1993) The psychology of folk psychology. BBS 16:15–28.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Joel Pust
Joel Pust
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721jpust@ccit.arizona.edu
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Abstract

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 392 - 393
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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