Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-11T02:07:00.083Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The weightless hat: Is self-deception optimal?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Elias L. Khalil
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. elias.khalil@monash.eduwww.eliaskhalil.com

Abstract

There are problems with the thesis of von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T): (1) It entails that self-deception arises from interpersonal deception – which may not be true; (2) it entails that self-deception is optimal – which is not necessarily so; and (3) it entails that interpersonal deception is optimum – which may not be true.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Babcock, L. & Loewenstein, G. (1997) Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1):109–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalil, E. L. (2009) Self-deceit and self-serving bias: Adam Smith on “general rules.” Journal of Institutional Economics 5(2):251–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalil, E. L. (2010) Adam Smith's concept of self-command as a solution to dynamic inconsistency and the commitment problem. Economic Inquiry 48(1):177–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalil, E. L. (submitted) Making sense of self-deception. Journal of Economic Psychology.Google Scholar
Rosenhan, D. L. & Messick, S. (1966) Affect and expectation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3:3844.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Smith, A. (1759/1982) The theory of moral sentiments, ed. Raphael, D. D. & Macfie, A. L.. Liberty Fund. (Original work published in 1759).CrossRefGoogle Scholar