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Reassessing the Italian “Economic Miracle”: Law, Firms’ Governance, and Management, 1950–1973

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2018

Paolo Di Martino  and
Michelangelo Vasta
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Abstract

This article revisits and reassesses the evolution of Italian capitalism during the so called “economic miracle” (1950–1973). Using original sources, it analyzes how the average small, private firm, representing the vast majority of Italian businesses at the time, struggled to fully develop, grow, and modernize. The paper identifies the main source of the problem in a set of inefficient (or poorly-enforced) laws and regulations that allowed firms to remain competitive, and business owners to extract resources out of them, using a wide variety of borderline strategies. This article also claims that accountants (commercialisti) had a key role in implementing these strategies.

Keywords

Italian capitalismfirms’ efficiencyGolden ageaccountants
Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 92 , Issue 2 , Summer 2018 , pp. 281 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2018 

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References

1 This novel is part of a trilogy usually known as Il maestro di Vigevano from the title of the most successful tale, which was originally published in 1962. Mastronardi, Lucio, Il meridionale di Vigevano, 2nd ed. (first ed. 1964; Torino, 1994), 384Google Scholar.

2 So much so that Ginsborg cited it as the only example. Ginsborg, Paul, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–80 (London, 1990), 237Google Scholar. For a detailed picture of Vigevano during the “economic miracle,” see Giorgio Bocca, “Mille fabbriche nessuna libreria,” Il Giorno, 10 Jan. 1962. It is worth noting the title of the article in English is “Thousand Factories No Bookshop.” For a general portrait of the Italian province during this period, see the travel diary by one of the most important Italian journalists, Bocca, Giorgio, Miracolo all'italiana (Milan, 1962)Google Scholar.

3 For example, Barca, Fabrizio, “Compromesso senza riforme nel capitalismo italiano,” in Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, ed. Barca, Fabrizio (Rome, 1997), 3–115Google Scholar.

4 Scholars such as Alberto Baccini and Marcello de Cecco have already suggested that in Italy accountants have a unique and broad role in the management of small and medium firms, but this early intuition has never been fully developed in the literature. See Alberto Baccini, “Alcune note sul ruolo del commercialista nel finanziamento delle PMI,” mimeo, author's personal paper (Firenze, 1998); de Cecco, Marcello, “Piccole imprese, banche, commercialisti. Note sui protagonisti della seconda industrializzazione italiana,” in Atti di intelligenza e sviluppo economico: Saggi per il bicentenario della nascita di Carlo Cattaneo, ed. Cafagna, Luciano and Crepax, Nicola (Bologna, 2001), 425–49Google Scholar.

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6 For a list of these sources, please see the online Appendix at the following website: http://docenti.unisi.it/michelangelovasta/pubblications/.

7 At first glance one might suspect that being cases decided in court, the sample is biased in the direction of including firms more prone to illegal or borderline behavior, and hence the results cannot be generalized. In fact, by looking at the final results of legal disputes, we discovered a wide variety of results, including cases where firms were brought to court and allegations discharged or firms that brought cases to court and won. In other words, the sample includes cases of “guilty” and “innocent” businesses; hence, their features and response to incentives given by the law can be considered the same as those of the general population of Italian firms of the time.

8 Considering our estimation of about 14,500 legal cases related to bankruptcy and insolvency (the biggest categories), our sample represents about a third of the total number of business-related cases discussed by the Corte di Cassazione. In order not to miss cases taking place during the golden age, we extended our sample to 1979 because the Corte di Cassazione was the final step in a long process, which usually started much earlier.

9 Comparing this data with recent estimates of regional GDP, we observe that the two series are quite similar with a slight under-representation of the northern regions and an over-representation of the southern ones, with the GDP shares for the three macroareas in the 1951–1971 period being the following: northern (56.7 percent), central (19.6 percent) and southern (23.7 percent). However, it must be considered that in this case, GDP is only a rough measure to be compared with our geographical distribution (as there are many other variables—firms’ size, sector of activity, and so on—that could influence the actual number of firms in a given area). For these estimates, see Felice, Emanuele, “Italy,” in The Economic Development of Europe's Regions: A Quantitative History Since 1900, ed. Rosés, Juan R. and Wolf, Nikolaus (New York, 2018)Google Scholar.

10 We selected a sample of 158 cases and managed to find almost 60 percent of the sample (90 cases). Also, in this sample, there is good coverage of the different regions of the country: 48.7 percent in the north; 26.8 percent central; and 24.4 percent in the south. These percentages are even closer to the GDP estimates presented above with only a slight over-representation of the central regions.

11 The speakers at the Congress were delegates from all regional branches of the Association, guaranteeing full national coverage.

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14 These estimates are from the Maddison Project Database, last accessed 3 June 2018, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. For details on this project, see Jutta Bolt, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong, and Jan Luiten van Zanden “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: New Income Comparisons and the Shape of Long-Run Economic Development,” Maddison Project Working Paper, no. 10, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands, Jan. 2018, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/html_publications/memorandum/gd174.pdf. The twelve countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

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17 Ibid., 103.

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23 Gomellini, Matteo and Pianta, Mario, “Commercio con l'estero e tecnologia in Italia negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta” in Innovazione tecnologica e sviluppo industriale nel secondo dopoguerra, ed. Antonelli, Cristiano et al. (Bari, 2007), 562–63Google Scholar.

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25 Nardozzi, “The Italian ‘Economic Miracle’.”

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32 Guinnane, Timothy, Harris, Ron, Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, “Putting the Corporation in its Place,” Enterprise & Society 8, no. 3 (2007): 687–729Google Scholar.

33 Fallimento Società A.L.P.E. v. Floris (for the former), Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 18 June 1958, and Gilli v. Fallimento Società Cotonificio di Samarate e Gilli (for the latter), Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 24 Oct. 1969,

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40 See, for instance, the opposite outcomes of the two cases: Belillo v. Fallimento Mantovani, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 19 Oct. 1955; Fallimento Benanti e Schillaci v. Benanti e Schillaci, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 2 May 1978.

41 Baccini, Alberto, “Artigiancassa: da Istituto di credito speciale a banca per le imprese artigiane,” in Atti e Documenti di Artigiancassa S.p.a., Artigiancassa: da Istituto di credito speciale a banca per le imprese artigiane 1953–2001 (Firenze, 2002), 7–101Google Scholar; Longoni, Giuseppe M. and Rinaldi, Alberto, “Industrial Policy and Artisan Firms (1930s–1970s),” in Forms of Enterprise in 20th Century Italy: Boundaries, Structures, and Strategies, ed. Colli, Andrea and Vasta, Michelangelo (Cheltenham, 2010), 204–24Google Scholar.

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43 Giancreco v. Romano e altri, Cassazione Penale, Sezione V, 6 May 1968; Sozzi e Soc. Colorificio Toscano v. fallimento Sozzi, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 16 Oct. 1965.

44 De Cusatis v. Saiwa e fallimento De Cusatis, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 18 May 1971.

45 Fallimento Lutz v. Lutz e altri, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 13 Apr. 1964.

46 Fallimento Melandri v. Banco di Napoli e Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia, Cassazione Civile, Sezione I, 9 Dec. 1976.

47 Pubblico Ministero v. Tavazzini, Cassazione Penale, Sezione III, 1 July 1963.

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50 This also applies to credit institutions. Small Italian firms relied mainly on local banks, which allocated credit largely on the basis of personal connections with business owners. Ottati, “Trust, Interlinking Transactions, and Credit,” 541–42. It is likely that business accountants, whose personal connections with potential creditors in particular were considered necessary professional qualities, were pivotal in establishing such connections. Mafera, Francesco, Il Commercialista (Firenze, 1964), 116–17Google Scholar. Additionally, the common practice of firms having multiple lines of credit with different banks created a two-way informal insurance against opportunistic behavior from either banks or firms; the former had only a limited amount of credit at stake with each individual firm, and the latter could easily afford to lose the support of one credit institution if it proved unreliable. Conti, Giuseppe and Ferri, Giovanni, “Banche locali e sviluppo economico decentrato,” in Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, ed. Barca, Fabrizio (Rome, 1997), 429–65Google Scholar.

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52 Bernardo Mattarella, speech, Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Napoli, 4–7 ottobre 1956 (Napoli, 1957), 427–30.

53 This might be one of the reasons why in Italy business consulting, as an independent field of activity, struggled to establish itself. For a detailed analysis of this category, see, for example, Crucini, Cristina, “The Development and Professionalization of the Italian Consultancy Market after WWII,” Business and Economic History 28 (Winter 1999): 7–18Google Scholar; and Crucini, Cristina and Kipping, Matthias, “Management Consultancies as Global Change Agents? Evidence from Italy,” Journal of Organizational Change Management 14, no. 6 (2001): 570–89Google Scholar.

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57 Such complaints were very common at annual meetings of the National Association. See, for example, Croce, Oreste, “Il ruolo del revisore ufficiale dei conti,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti (Milano, 1946), 359–63Google Scholar; Pietro Aricò, “Attuale orientamento della professione di Dottore Commercialista in Italia e delle professioni corrispondenti in altri paesi,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Napoli, 4–7 ottobre 1956, 183–89; Luigi Rocco, “Orientamenti e collegamenti professionali,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Napoli, 4–7 ottobre 1956, 191–203; Angeli, Dino, “La crescente importanza dei problemi professionali,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Trieste, 21–25 settembre 1966 (Trieste, 1968), 387–402Google Scholar. Luigi Antonelli, “Funzioni e compiti del dottore commercialista,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Trieste, 21–25 settembre 1966, 201–40; Sala, “Prospettive del dottore commercialista e ordinamento professionale,” 290; and Fiorentini, “Sviluppo capitalistico e professioni economiche,” 292.

58 Fiorentini, “Sviluppo capitalistico e professioni economiche,” 284–85. Evidence of this also surfaces in the case Rossi e De Mattia v. Tribunale di Treviso, Cassazione penale, Sezione III, 18 Feb.1957 in which Mattia Nerino, commercialista of the firm Officine Meccaniche Rossi Romeo, owned by Romeo Rossi, argued that he was in full charge of management of the firm.

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67 This opinion belongs to Federico Maria Pacces, university professor and founder of the economic newspaper 24 ore. See Mafera, I commercialisti, 106.

68 Parea, Aldo, “Una forma di pseudo ‘cessio bonorum’,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Palermo 2–5 ottobre 1958 (Palermo, 1960), 321–22Google Scholar.

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72 Rossi e De Mattia v. Tribunale di Treviso, Cassazione Penale, Sezione III, 18 Feb. 1957.

73 Rocco, “Orientamenti e collegamenti professionali”; and Fiorentini, “Sviluppo capitalistico e professioni economiche,” 285.

74 Franco Antolini, “Tecnica e politica dei bilanci di esercizio delle imprese,” in Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Napoli, 4–7 ottobre 1956, 333–38. Between 1980 and 1985, for example, the number of commercialisti increased by 32 percent after increasing by only 13 percent between 1976 and 1980. Also, in 1976 the ragionieri commercialisti—accountants dealing mainly with the smallest firms—were about 40 percent of the total, a share that increased to almost 50 percent in 1985. Authors’ calculation from Fiorentini, “Sviluppo capitalistico e professioni economiche,” table 13, 278.

75 Sala, “Prospettive del dottore commercialista e ordinamento professionale”; Croce, “Il ruolo del revisore ufficiale dei conti”; and Rocco, “Orientamenti e collegamenti professionali.”

76 Rocco, “Orientamenti e collegamenti professionali”; Antonelli, “Funzioni e compiti del dottore commercialista,” 217; and Aricò, “Attuale orientamento della professione di Dottore Commercialista in Italia.”

77 Data from Fiorentini, “Sviluppo capitalistico e professioni economiche,” 282.

78 Law n. 1815, 23 Nov. 1939, D isciplina giuridica degli studi di assi s tenza e di consulenza.

79 Angeli, “La crescente importanza dei problemi professionali.”

80 Di Martino, Paolo and Vasta, Michelangelo, “Companies’ Insolvency and ‘the Nature of the Firm’ in Italy, 1920s–1970s,” Economic History Review 63, no. 1 (2010): 137–64Google Scholar.

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82 Luigi Antonelli, “La ‘cessio bonorum’ quale soluzione stragiudiziale in taluni casi patologici d'impresa,” Congresso nazionale dei dottori commercialisti: Palermo 2–5 ottobre 1958, 263–78.

83 Parea, “Una forma di pseudo ‘cessio bonorum’,” 324.

84 Ibid., 322

85 Pubblico Ministero v. procura Delindati, Cassazione Penale, Sezione V, 7 June 1973.

86 Leone (avv. Di Altieri) v. Sentenza corte d'appello tribunale di Genova, Cassazione Penale, Sezione III, 23 Feb. 1959.

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88 Gianni Toniolo, “An Overview of Italy's Economic Growth,” in The Oxford Handbook, 35.

89 Crafts and Magnani, “The Golden Age and the Second Globalization in Italy,” 69–107.

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91 Colli and Rinaldi, “Institutions, Politics.”

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