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Sectoral Influence on Competition Legislation: Evidence from the Cartel Registers, 1920–2000

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2019

Susanna Fellman  and
Martin Shanahan
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Abstract

Legislation that required the registration of firms’ anticompetitive agreements (cartel registers) to reveal, and sometimes regulate, anticompetitive behavior was relatively common in many nations before 1975. Examining the introduction of these registers in sixteen mostly OECD countries between 1920 and 2000 reveals which industries and sectors appeared to minimize successfully the impact of the legislation in their jurisdiction. We find considerable variation, but in most countries, the agriculture and export sectors were especially successful in avoiding or delaying the application of a register in their areas of interest.

Keywords

business regulationanticompetitive behaviorpolicy influencecartel register
Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 92 , Issue 4 , Winter 2018 , pp. 633 - 660
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2019 

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Footnotes

The authors are grateful for insightful comments from several colleagues, two anonymous referees and the editors of Business History Review.

References

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