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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN ENGLISH AND DUTCH LAW: A MULTIFUNCTIONAL AND CONTEXT-DEPENDANT DIVIDE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2012

Gerdy Jurgens  and
Frank van Ommeren
Gerdy Jurgens*
Affiliation:
Professor of Administrative Law, Utrecht University. www.uu.nl/rebo/medewerkers/GTJMJurgens
Frank van Ommeren
Affiliation:
Professor of Constitutional and Administrative law, Centre of Law and Governance, VU University Amsterdam. www.rechten.vu.nl/ommeren
*
Address for correspondence: Professor Dr Gerdy Jurgens, Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, Achter Sint Pieter 200, 3512 HT Utrecht, The Netherlands. Email: gjurgens@uul.nl
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Abstract

The main thesis of this article is that the public-private divide has to be considered as a multifunctional and context-dependant divide. This thesis is demonstrated by comparing English law and Dutch law. The authors describe two areas in which the divide is relevant: judicial review and the applicability of public law standards including human rights. In both legal systems discussions concerning the private-public divide relate to the transfer of power to private bodies. However, in the Dutch – continental – legal system the label ‘public law’ is used in fewer kinds of cases than in the English legal system. This remarkable finding might be explained by the characterization of the public-private division as multifunctional and context-dependant.

Keywords

Judicial reviewpublic law-private law boundaryNetherlandsEngland
Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 172 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2012

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References

1 Harlow, C., “‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Law: Definition without Distinction” (1980) 43 M.L.R. 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 J.W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: a Historical and Comparative Perspective in English Public Law, revised edn. (Oxford 2000).

3 D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London 1999) and recently: “What, if Any, Public-Private Divides Exist in English Law?” in M. Ruffert (ed.), The Public-Private Divide: Potential for Transformation? (London 2009), 1 ff.

4 P. Cane, “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, in N. Bamforth, P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003), 247 ff.; M. Freedland, “The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law” in M. Freedland and J.-B. Auby (eds.), The Public Law/Private Law Divide, Une entente assez cordiale? (Oxford & Portland Oregon 2006), 93 ff.

5 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law.

6 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, pp. 34–39.

7 Ibid., p. 36. Although it is tempting to do so, it is not our purpose to discuss the model's features. We are only using this model as a tool of analysis, since it is well known and rather influential in English legal doctrine.

8 Ibid., p. 235.

9 Ibid., p. 40.

10 Op.cit., p. 235.

11 See Van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht, 15th edn. (Deventer 2006), 3 ff.

12 This is considered to be roughly the same in the UK. See Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, p. 74.

13 In particular concerning the statesman Johan Rudolph Thorbecke. See E. Poortinga, De scheiding van publiek- en privaatrecht bij Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798–1872) (Nijmegen 1987).

14 See e.g. P. Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept” in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Third Series) (Oxford 1987), 57.

15 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, p. 34.

16 B.P. Vermeulen, “De publieke taak: een veel-zijdig begrip”, in J.W. Sap, B.P. Vermeulen and C.M. Zoethout (eds.), De publieke taak (Deventer 2003), pp. 20 ff.

17 See for instance Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory (London 2008).

18 See in a multinational context: J. Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism. How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better (Cheltenham and Northampton 2008), 21.

19 Swaak, Christof R.A., “Public Law in the Netherlands” (1995) 1 E.P.L. 43Google Scholar.

20 A proposal to extend the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) with provisions on public authority liability has been recently sent to Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2010/2011 (Parliamentary Documents, Second Chamber), 32 621, no. 1–4. Aanvulling van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht met bepalingen over nadeelcompensatie en schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (Wet nadeelcompensatie en schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige besluiten).

21 A.F.M Brenninkmeijer, “Chapter 3 Judicial Organization”, in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), at pp. 54–55 and 61. See for a description of the historical development towards the current court system: R.J.G.H. Seerden & F.A.M. Stroink, “Administrative Law in the Netherlands”, in: R.J.G.H. Seerden (ed.), Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States. A Comparative Analysis (Antwerp & Oxford 2007), 184 ff.

22 In Dutch: de Centrale Raad van Beroep. The translation used on the official website of the Dutch judiciary (www.rechtspraak.nl

23 In Dutch: het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, “officially” translated as “the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal”. See the previous footnote for a comment on this designation.

24 A.J.C. de Moor-van Vugt and B.W.N. de Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law” in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), 364 ff.

25 J.W.F. Allison, “Variations of view on English legal distinctions between public and private” [2007] C.L.J. 702.

26 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, pp. 40, 235, and Allison, “Variations of view”, p. 703.

27 Cane, “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, p. 271.

28 P. Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford, 4th ed., 2004), 17.

29 “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, p. 275.

30 Ibid., p. 271. Cane refers to Scott, C., “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 56CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Scott, C., “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 38, 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Interesting for this approach is also C. Scott, “Spontaneous Accountability”, in M.W. Dowdle (ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 2006), 174 ff and C. Scott, “Self-Regulation and the Meta-Regulatory State”, in F. Cafaggi (ed.), Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), 131 ff.

31 Ibid., p. 275.

32 Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept”, p. 78.

33 Polycontexturality has become one of the central elements of autopoietic social and legal theory. The autopoiesis of Gunther Teubner, which is based on the system theory of especially Luhmann, did receive substantial attention in Dutch legal doctrine at the beginning of the 1990s, partly because of the influence of the then Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, who was originally a constitutional and administrative legal scholar.

34 Cane argues that Teubner does not reject the public-private distinction (“Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, p. 273). However, like Allison (“Variations of view”, p. 701) we suppose that this interpretation of the, albeit very abstract, article by Teubner is not fully correct: the idea of polycontexturality is in the eyes of Teubner – who tries to transcend the distinction – an alternative to the public-private law divide, see Teubner, G., “After Privatization? The Many Autonomies of Private Law” (1998) 51 Current Legal Problems 395CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 396 and 407.

35 Freedland, “The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law”, pp. 107 ff.

36 O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237.

37 An English version of the General Administrative Law Act can be found on the website of the Dutch Government (www.rijksoverheid.nl) at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/besluiten/2009/10/01/general-administrative-law-act-text-per-1-october-2009.html.

38 See E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] Q.B. 1044.

39 In English law judicial review is referred to as “residual” or “a remedy in last resort”. This qualification expresses the precedence of other public law remedies (statutory appeals) to judicial review. However, it does not define the position of judicial review with respect to the ordinary procedure. In Dutch law the qualification “residual” is used to express the precedence of the route for judicial protection by the administrative courts to the civil proceedings.

40 HR 31 December 1915, (1916) NJ 416. [HR is the abbreviation for Hoge Raad (Supreme Court). NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) are Dutch Law Reports.]

41 See HR 20 November 1924, (1925) NJ 89 (Ostermann I).

42 GALA, s. 1:3(1).

43 See on the different kinds of decisions: De Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 345 ff.

44 De Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 349 and Seerden & Stroink, “Administrative Law in the Netherlands”, note 21 above, p. 172–175.

45 On the contrary: there is also an important track of case law as to the question whether the use of private law instruments by public bodies is permitted, concerning the fact that the authorities also have public law instruments for the same or similar purposes. This is referred to as the “two-way doctrine” (twee-wegenleer). The landmark case on this subject is the Windmill case, HR 26 January 1990, Ned. Jur. (1990) 393. See Verheij, N., “From Private Law to Public Law” (2000) 12 European Review of Public Law 495Google Scholar.

46 Van Wijk/Konijnenbelt & Van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht (The Hague, 14th ed. 2008), p. 193.

47 In the definition in GALA, s. 1:1(1)(a): an organ of a juristic person governed by public law.

48 ABRvS 10 April 1995, (1995) AB 498. [ABRvS is the abbreviation for Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative Law Division of the Council of State). AB means Adminisratiefrechtelijke beslissingen (Dutch Administrative Law Reports).]

49 Another example is the case of the Groningen Water Supply System, in which the Groningen municipal authorities prohibited the waterworks from laying underground pipes in municipal land, ARRvS 1 December 1977, AB (1978) 208 or a case concerning the municipal authority”' refusal to pay for a private company's relocation costs, ABRvS 11 May 1998, (1998) AB 298.

50 GALA, s. 1:1 (1) (b).

51 These “other administrative authorities” are often – but not always – of a hybrid character. However, this category should not be identified as wholly equivalent to the hybrid authorities of the HRA in English law.

52 Thus, the Examination Board of a private school granting official certificates is vested with public authority. See ABRvS 17 July 2000, (2000) AB 446.

53 ABRvS 30 November 1995, (1996) AB 136. Another example can be found in the case concerning the “Relief Fund for the Victims of the Bijlmer Aircraft Disaster Foundation” (Stichting Hulpfonds Gedupeerden Bijlmerramp), ABRvS 27 August 2003, (2004) AB 10.

54 See for an overview of these tests: H. Woolf, J. Jowell & A. Le Sueur, De Smith's Judicial Review, 6th edn. (London 2007), 124 ff.

55 For the purpose of the comparison it is not worthwhile considering the prerogative powers.

56 F.J. van Ommeren and G.A. van der Veen, Het Awb-besluit (Nijmegen 1999), 43 ff.

57 Ibid., pp. 122–123

58 It should be noted that in English law decisions concerning governmental property taken by local authorities or by other statutory bodies need a statutory basis, see R. v Somerset County Council ex p. Fewings [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1037. This does not apply to central government; in this respect these authorities are considered to have powers which they have in common with every individual. This is referred to as the “third source of power”. See Harris, B.V., “The “third source” of authority for government action revisited” (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 226–250Google Scholar.

59 Although rule 54(1) CPR, in which the public function test is established, suggests that the public function test is the overall test for amenability to judicial review. See also C.D. Campbell, “The nature of power as public in English judicial review” [2009] C.L.J. 90 who speculates about the non-complementary status of the public function test. Oliver however alerts us to not taking the text of CPR Pt 54 too literally, because it is “shorthand for quite complex case law”. See Oliver, D., “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act” (2004) P.L. 346Google Scholar, 347.

60 According to Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith's Judicial Review, pp. 124–125 the public function test is also used for qualifying statutory acts based on Private Acts of Parliament.

61 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] Q.B. 815.

62 See op.cit., pp. 133–137.

63 Colin D. Campbell has critically examined the “but for” test and the “statutory underpinning” test (“The nature of power as public in English judicial review”, pp. 90–117) and has even promoted a monopoly test as the sole test – also replacing the source of power test – for determining the availability of judicial review (Campbell, C. D., “Monopoly power as public power for the purposes of judicial review” (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491–521Google Scholar).

64 As to the “other administrative authorities” this does not hold true, since they are only administrative authorities in as far as they take decisions in which case the administrative courts will be competent.

65 E.J. Daalder, G.R.J. de Groot, J.M.E. van Breugel (eds.), De parlementaire geschiedenis van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht: Tweede Tranche (Alphen aan den Rijn 1994), 174. See also De Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 364 ff.

66 See for instance, H. Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th edn. (Abingdon 2006), 719. However, Craig argues that this historical explanation is incorrect, See Craig, P., “Ultra vires and the foundations of judicial review” [1998] C.L.J. at pp. 79Google Scholar ff.

67 Oliver, D., “Is the ultra vires rule the basis of judicial review?” [1987] P.L. 543Google Scholar. See for the debate between the supporters of the Ultra-vires model and the rights-based approach: C. Forsyth (ed.), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Oxford 2000); M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Oxford-Portland 2001).

68 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith's Judicial Review, pp. 7, 8.

69 Craig, just as many others, nowadays advocates a rights-based approach, see P. Craig, Administrative Law (London, 6th ed., 2008), pp. 18 ff. Poole, who strongly criticises this approach, labels it as common law constitutionalism (CLC). See Poole, T., “Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism” (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 453Google Scholar; “Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism” (2005) 25 L.S. 142.

70 Olha Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party (Utrecht/Munich 2007), 104 ff and Chantal Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and England (Austin 2008), 145 and 146.

71 ABRvS 29 September 1994, (1995) AB 210.

72 M. Scheltema and M.W. Scheltema, Gemeenschappelijk recht: Wisselwerking tussen publiek- en privaatrecht, 2nd edn. (Alpen aan den Rijn 2008), 6.

73 HR 24 April 1992, (1992) AB 542; (1993) NJ 232 (Zeeland/Hoondert).

74 The concept of administrative authorities in Dutch law is a general concept which is codified in the GALA and is applied in the entire area of administrative law. Therefore, the interpretation given to this concept, considered in the previous section, as to the amenability to appeal is also relevant for the applicability of the principles of proper administration.

75 Kamerstukken II, 1975/76 (Parliamentary Documents, Second Chamber), 13,872, no. 3, p. 15.

76 Rasti Rostelli: HR 26 April 1996, (1996) AB 372; (1996) NJ 728.

77 Kamerstukken II (Second Chamber) 1975/76, 13 872 no. 3, pp. 15, 16. See E.A. Alkema, “Chapter 16 Constitutional Law” in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), 307.

78 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht, 6th edn., (Deventer 2008), 389 ff. L.F.M. Besselink, “Voetangels en klemmen: de horizontale werking van burger- en politieke rechten”, in C. Flinterman and W. van Genugten (eds.), Niet-statelijke actoren en de rechten van de mens: gevestigde waarden, nieuwe wegen (The Hague 2003), 3. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party, pp. 104 ff.

79 See e.g. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party, pp. 106 ff.

80 HR 18 June 1993, (1994) NJ 347. See for an English translation: L.F.M. Besselink (ed.), Constitutional Law of the Netherlands: An Introduction with Texts, Cases and Materials (Nijmegen 2004), 159.

81 In favour of a horizontal effect appears to be, for example, H.R.A Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford 10th ed., 2009), 160. There is also the view that because the courts are “public authorities”, they are obliged to apply human rights in relationships between individuals. In addition to this there is the view (for example, Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act”, note 59 above, p. 334) that on the basis of the ECHR the participating states are obliged to design a legal system in which individuals are protected against the violation of their rights by other individuals. Consequently, it would not have been necessary to design a special regime for public authorities. Indeed, one can find a few cases in which the courts practise some kind of horizontal approach (Douglas v Hello! concerning privacy). However, there is no general acceptance of a horizontal effect.

82 See e.g. Craig, P., “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551Google Scholar; Palmer, Elizabeth, “Should public health be a private concern? Developing a public service paradigm in English law” (2002) 22 O.J.L.S 663CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sunkin, Maurice, “Pushing forward the frontiers of human rights protection: the meaning of public authority under the Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. 643Google Scholar; Dawn Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. 329; Cane, Peter, “Church, state and human rights: are parish councils public authorities?” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 41Google Scholar; Helen Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of a “public authority” under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106; S. Palmer, “Public private and the Human Rights Act 1998: an ideological divide” [2007] C.L.J. 559; Jonny Landau, “Functional public authorities after YL” [2007] P.L. 630; C.M. Donnelly, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties. A Comparative Perspective (Oxford 2007), 245 ff. See also two reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act (Seventh Report of Session 2003–04, London: HMSO 2004 and Ninth Report of Session 2006–07, London: HMSO 2007).

83 Oliver however warns against this kind of reasoning, see Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act”, pp. 346–348.

84 See in this sense: P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review, p. 556.

85 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27; [2007] 3 W.L.R. 112.

86 However, it should be noted that prior to the YL case several courts had already ruled that similar decisions by private bodies as emerged in the YL case were not amenable to judicial review. See R v Servite Houses, ex parte Goldsmith [2001] 33 H.L.R. 35 and R v Leonard Cheshire Foundation, ex parte Heather [2002] ECWA Civ 366.

87 Thus it is interesting to note that Lord Neuberger in his opinion in the YL case ([2007] 3 W.L.R. at 164) already took a shot across the bows: in his view the provision of health or education services in a private school or hospital would not obviously be considered as a function of a public nature.

88 G.T.J.M. Jurgens and F.J. van Ommeren, De opmars van het onderscheid tussen publiekrecht en privaatrecht in het Engelse recht (The Hague 2009), 108–110.