Article contents
Conscientious Objection and “Effective Referral”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 December 2016
Abstract:
Complicity in an immoral, and even criminal, activity, such as robbery or murder, is itself regarded as involving responsibility for those acts. What should the position be of health professionals who are expected to participate in actions that they believe are morally wrong? Professional responsibilities may clash with private conscience. Even referring a patient to someone else, when what is in question may be assisted suicide, or euthanasia, seems to involve some complicity. This is a live issue in Canada, but similar dilemmas occur elsewhere. Physicians and others should not be coerced into involvement of any kind in what they regard as wrong. Such coercion goes against the very principles of liberal democracy. Conscience matters. Reasonable accommodation should be given to those whose moral judgment may be at variance with prevailing professional norms. Moral questions should still be given weight within medicine, and disagreements respected. Dedication to the promotion of human welfare should be paramount, but it should be recognized that there may be different visions of what such welfare consists of.
Keywords
- Type
- Special Section: Conscientious Objection in Healthcare: Problems and Perspectives
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016
References
Notes
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