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Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into Activism Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Richard Jochelson
Richard Jochelson
Affiliation:
University of Winnipeg, Department of Criminal Justice, r.jochelson@uwinnipeg.ca
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Abstract

This article draws on Cohn and Kremnitzer's multidimensional analysis of judicial activism and applies the analysis in the Canadian context. The analysis is conducted in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions giving the police the power to conduct sniffer-dog searches. That case context serves as a substrate to reveal the utility and limitations of a multidimensional approach. While recent scholarship on judicial activism has focused on quantifying activism over time, court composition, and constitutional issues, this article contends that there is potential to introduce even more texture into activism scholarship by paying attention to the interstitial details of judicial reasoning rather than focusing on the disposition alone. This textured approach accepts that what the Court says in these interstices is important because it is part of a discussion about core constitutional principles. Activism scholarship is informed by an investigation into deviations from one's particular allegiance to constitutional norms. The nomenclature of these norms is relatively certain, yet their exact definition remains open to vigorous debate. This race for content lies at the heart of much activist-based critique. Multidimensional analysis can help form the language of this conversation, aid in giving content and order to debates, and help us to discover our normative constitutional content. This content is the starting point for critical evaluation of our constitutional norms.

Résumé

Cet article s'appuie sur l'analyse multidimensionnelle de l'activisme judiciaire de Cohn et de Kremnitzer et applique celle-ci dans le contexte canadien. L'analyse est effectuée suite aux décisions récentes de la Cour suprême qui donnaient aux policiers le droit d'utiliser des chiens renifleurs durant des fouilles. Ce contexte légal sert de substrat afin de démontrer l'utilité ainsi que les limitations de l'approche multidimensionnelle. Tandis que l'activisme académique s'est concentré sur la quantification de l'activisme à travers le temps, sur la composition de la cour et sur des questions constitutionnelles, cet article affirme qu'il existe un certain potentiel pour un activisme académique plus «texturé», en portant une attention particulière sur les détails interstitiels du raisonnement judiciaire plutôt qu'uniquement sur sa disposition. Cette approche «texturée» reconnaît l'importance des décisions de la cour dans ces interstices puisque celles-ci font partie des discussions sur les grands principes constitutionnels. L'activisme académique est enrichi par l'étude des déviations d'une allégeance particulière vers des normes constitutives. La nomenclature de ces normes est relativement certaine. Néanmoins, leur définition exacte demeure sujette à un débat vigoureux. L'empressement vers l'acquisition d'un contenu réside au cœur même de plusieurs critiques activistes. L'analyse multidimensionnelle est susceptible de contribuer au langage de cette discussion. Elle peut donner du sens ainsi qu'apporter de l'ordre aux débats. Cette analyse peut contribuer aussi àla découverte de notre contenu normatif constitutionnel. Ce contenu représente, en quelques sortes, le point de départ pour une évaluation critique de nos normes constitutives.

Keywords

activisme judiciairedroit constitutionnelfouillesperquisitions et saisies abusivesle critère de l'arrêt Waterfieldles pouvoirs des policierschien policierjudicial activismconstitutional lawunreasonable search and seizureWaterfield testpolice powerssniffer dog
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 231 - 249
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2009

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