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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2014
Feminism has a particular problem in dealing with questions of sexuality. This is directly tied to the fact that it is our sexuality which has so often been used to deny us rights. Our ambivalence has led some of us to make strange choices. For instance, some of us have joined with conservatives, our natural enemies, campaigning against pornography. This paper looks at another area in which conflicts within the feminist philosophy have worked to confuse our responses and allowed them to be used to undermine the very people we proclaim ourselves the protectors of: women. In two major cases since 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada has quoted feminist words to undermine the position of prostitutes in our society. In addition, LEAF failed to apply for intervenor status on behalf of prostitutes in either case. What does it mean when mainstream feminism finds itself unable to listen to the demands of prostitutes' rights groups and to help them get rid of the laws that make their work more difficult and dangerous? What does it say about feminism as a true “women's movement” that we find ourselves unable to honor other women's assessment of their position in society and their desires for change.
Le féminisme est confronté à un problème particulier lorsqu'il doit traiter de questions de sexualité. Il en est ainsi notamment parce que notre sexualité a bien souvent été utilisée pour nous nier des droits. Cette ambivalence a mené certaines d'entre nous à poser des choix étranges. Ainsi, quelques-unes se sont jointes aux conservateurs, nos ennemis naturels, pour faire campagne contre la pornographie. Cet article se penche sur un autre domaine au sein duquel des conflits à l'intérieur de la philosophie féministe ont eu pour effet de semer la confusion dans nos propos et ont permis qu'ils soient ensuite utilisés afin de miner la position des personnes mêmes dont nous nous prétendons les protecteurs: les femmes. Dans deux décisions majeures rendues depuis 1990, la Cour suprême du Canada a cité des propos féministes pour affaiblir la position des prostituées dans notre société. De plus, le Fonds d'éducation et d'action juridique (F.E.A.J.) n'a pas jugé bon de demander le statut d'intervenant pour représenter les intérêts des prostituées dans l'une ou l'autre de ces causes. Comment doiton interpréter cette incapacité du courant féministe dominant à être attentif aux revendications des groupes de protection des droits des prostituées et à les aider à se débarrasser des lois qui rendent le travail de celles qu'ils représentent plus difficile et dangereux? Quelle image du féminisme en tant que vrai «mouvement des femmes» projetons-nous lorsque nous sommes incapables de respecter l'évaluation que font d'autres femmes de leur propre position au sein de la société ainsi que leurs désirs de changement?
1. Reference Re Sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.) (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (S.C.C.).
2. Pateman, C., “Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson” (1983) 93 Ethics 561 at 561CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3. For a discussion of changes in the nature of sex in keeping with changes in the nature of society, see Giddens, A., The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992)Google Scholar. See especially his references to “confluent love” and the democratization of sex, passim.
4. This is very controversial, arguments depending heavily on definitions of power. However, until we have a better source for reference, we must take prostitutes' word for what the power dynamic “feels” like at the time of sale. Lobel, K. in Naming the Violence (Seattle: Seal Press, 1986) at 123Google Scholar, asserts: “Many men who regularly visit prostitutes wish to assume a passive, not an active role, whether or not this involves actual masochistic practices.” This surely is a threat to patriarchal order and may be for that reason a catalyst for violence.
5. See discussion in Overall, C., “What's Wrong with Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work” (1992) 17 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 705 at 711CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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8. R. v. Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10.
9. “Supreme Court Decision Re Prostitution”, The Homestretch, CBC-Radio, Calgary, 4 June 1990.
10. “Prostitution Ruling”, The [Calgary] Herald (13 June 1990) A5Google ScholarPubMed.
11. For a discussion of the anti-pornography/anti-censorship schism in the Canadian feminist movement, see my article “Chilling Expression: Obscenity Law and the Halo Zone” in Holmes, H. & Taras, D., eds., Seeing Ourselves: Media Power and Policy in Canada (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992) 270Google Scholar.
12. For example, an active prostitutes' rights group out of Atlanta, Georgia, has chosen the acronym HIRE (Hooking Is Real Employment) for itself.
13. J. Dickin McGinnis, supra note 11.
14. Just as Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin are the main theoreticians for the anti-pornography movement, much of the theory for the anti-prostitution movement stems from the early work of Kathleen Barry. The Canadian arms of this movement have carefully followed the American lead. For the seminal works, see Dworkin, A., Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Putnam, 1981)Google Scholar and Barry, K., Female Sexual Slavery (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1979)Google Scholar.
15. R. v. Hutt, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 476.
16. Such a law must not interfere with federal powers in the area of criminal law, as provided in the case of R. v. Westendorp, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43.
17. An interesting take on prostitution in Africa looks at the various reasons women enter what becomes by socially-prescribed necessity, a way of life, not just a way of providing for one's economic needs. See Tabet, P., “I'm the Meat, I'm the Knife: Sexual Service, Migration, and Repression in Some African Societies” in Pheterson, G., ed., A Vindication of the Rights of Whores (Seattle: Seal Press, 1989) 204Google Scholar. Reprinted in (1991) 3 Feminist Issues 3.
18. For a recent, brief discussion of this early anti-prostitution campaign, see Valverde, M., The Age of Light, Soap and Water. Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–1925 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991)Google Scholar. Chapter 4 at 77 deals with “The White Slavery Panic”.
19. Supra note 1 at 118–19.
20. Ibid. at 118.
21. Ibid. at 131.
22. Boyle, C. et al. , A Feminist Review of Criminal Law (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, December 1985)Google Scholar.
23. Ibid. at 54.
24. Supra note 17 at 146. Eva Rosta, an English photo model turned prostitute is speaking here. Compare this to the position taken by both Pateman, C., “What's Wrong with Prostitution?” in Pateman, C., ed., The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 190Google Scholar and Overall, supra note 5, that unlike other types of service work, prostitution involves sale of the body, not just of the service and therefore approaches, if it does not actually constitute, slavery. I find the distinctions made to be exceedingly fine and, in the end, unconvincing.
25. Peggy Miller, founder of the Canadian Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes, to a group of feminists at a dinner in April 1985. Quoted in Bell, L., ed., Good Girls/Bad Girls: Sex Trade Workers and Feminists Face to Face (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1987) at 11Google Scholar.
26. Pheterson, supra note 17 at 169–70.
27. Bell, supra note 25 at 213.
28. Personal telephone interview with Kathleen Mahoney, 29 January 1992.
29. R. v. Keegstra (1990), 77 Alta L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.).
30. R. v. Butler (1992), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (S.C.C.).
31. Personal telephone interview with Connie Nakatsu, legal counsel for LEAF, 13 July 1992.
32. Popularly known as the rape-shield law. Now Sections 273.1, 273.2 and 276–276.5 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C–46, as amended in S.C. 1992, c. 38Google ScholarPubMed.
33. Hollibaugh, A., “Desire for the Future: Radical Hope in Passion and Pleasure” in Vance, C. S., ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 409Google Scholar. Quoted in Rich, B. Ruby, “Feminism and Sexuality in the 1980s” (1986) 12 Feminist Studies 525 at 537Google Scholar.
34. See, for example, Tomalin, C., The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft (New York: Mentor, 1974) at 104Google Scholar.
35. Mander, C., Emily Murphy: Rebel (Toronto: Simon & Pierre, 1985) at 100–01Google Scholar. See Larsen, E. N., “Canadian Prostitution Control Between 1914 and 1970: An Exercise in Chauvinist Reasoning” (1992) 7:2Canadian Journal of Law and Society 137Google Scholar, for a discussion of the problems women's groups in Canada have had in coming to terms with prostitution.
36. From Vindication of the Rights of Woman, quoted in Pheterson, supra note 17 at 3.
37. Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Pornography and Prostitution in Canada, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985)Google Scholar.
38. Ibid. at 379, quoted in R. v. Downey, supra note 8, Cory decision at 33.
39. Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, Sexual Offences Against Children, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984)Google Scholar.
40. Ibid. at 1057–58, as quoted in R. v. Downey, supra note 8, Cory decision at 33.
41. R. v. Downey, supra note 8, McLachlin decision at 47.
42. Bell, supra note 25 at 114.
43. See, for example, the personal stories of an Indian prostitute and a Filipino prostitute in Pheterson, supra note 17 at 91, 99.
