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Akratic Action under the Guise of the Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2020

Eugene Chislenko Open the ORCID record for Eugene Chislenko [Opens in a new window]
Eugene Chislenko*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
*
Email: chislenko@temple.edu
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Abstract

Many philosophers have thought that human beings do or pursue only what we see as good. These “guise-of-the-good” views face powerful challenges and counterexamples, such as akratic action, in which we do what we ourselves believe we ought not do. I propose a new way for guise-of-the-good views to address this central counterexample by appealing to conflicting beliefs. I then answer concerns that this appeal is insufficiently explanatory, attributes too much conflict, leaves out an essential asymmetry in action against one’s “better” judgment, attributes systematic error about one’s own beliefs, and is too implausible.

Keywords

Guise of the goodakrasiaintentional actionintentionbeliefDonald Davidson
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 5 , July 2020 , pp. 606 - 621
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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