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Finding Value in Davidson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Robert H. Myers
Robert H. Myers*
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto, ON, M3J 1P3Canada
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Extract

Can an effective argument against scepticism about objective values be modelled on Donald Davidson's familiar argument against scepticism about external things?

Davidson evidently thinks so. He has long been on record as maintaining that a theory of interpretation must be ‘unified’ in the sense that it cannot merely solve f or beliefs and meanings but must simultaneously solve for desires as well. And he has made it quite clear that he thinks a theory of interpretation can do this only by subjecting attributions of desires to a ‘principle of charity’ analogous to the principle that he claims must govern attributions of beliefs. Since his argument against external world scepticism is in large part powered by his claim that charity must govern attributions of beliefs, his feeling that charity must likewise govern attributions of desires might appear to commit him to a similar argument against value scepticism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2004 , pp. 107 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

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