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Humean Pleasures Reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 1975

Stephen D. Hudson
Stephen D. Hudson*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Extract

Hume, among others, has received bad press on his views about the nature of pleasure. I shall argue that such complaints rest on an incomplete and somewhat distorted view of Hume's enterprise. In addition, I shall attempt to rectify this state of affairs by explicating the manner in which Hume deploys the concept of pleasure in his value theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , December 1975 , pp. 545 - 562
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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References

* This paper has been benefited by criticisms from Stephen Darwall, W.D. Falk, and Arthur Kuflik.

1 Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A. 1968 reprint of 1888 edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), (l,i,2) pp. 7–8.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as T.)

2 T., (l,iv,2), p. 192, my emphasis. See also: pp. 192; 226.

3 T., (ll,i,1), p. 275.

4 T., (ll,i,1), pp. 275–276.

5 Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 77.Google Scholar A similar view is found in Kenny's, Anthony Action, Emotion, and Will, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).Google Scholar

6 Ryle, Gilbert “Pleasure,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 28 (1954), pp. 135–146Google Scholar; Gosling, J.C.B. Pleasure and Desire, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Penelhum, Terence “The logic of Pleasure,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17 (1956-57), pp. 488–503Google Scholar; Williams, B.A.O. “Pleasure and Belief;’Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 33 (1959), pp. 57–72.Google Scholar

7 There are some important complications concerning ‘being pleased’ idioms which must be dealt with by a proper account. See: Gosling (loe. cit.) and 1.0. Urmson, “Aristotle on Pleasure,” in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Moravcsik, J.M.E. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 323–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Ryle, “Pleasure,” p. 199.

9 For further development of the treatment of pleasure as a pro-attitude, see an elaboration on these lines of the conceptual connection between this relation and desire in Jackson's, Reginald “Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism,” Philosophy, 18 (1943), pp. 114–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Nagel's, Thomas “Sexual Perversion,” The Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 This is not quite correct as Hume is committed, I think, to specific locations or localizability for this sort of pleasure, e.g., something like the point of pain one feels when one's arm is pricked in a nasty fashion by a pin. But nothing hangs on this.

11 T., (II,i,2) pp. 275–276.

12 T., (II,i,2), pp. 275–27 .

13 T., (II,ii,5), p. 358, my emphasis. See also: pp. 469; 472-473; 574; 575; and 586.

14 T., (II,i,1), p. 276.

15 T., (II,iii,5), p. 451, my emphasis.

16 T., (II,iii,5), p. 452, my emphasis.

17 T., (III,iii,1), p. 581, my emphasis. See also: pp. 196; 299; 358; 375; 471; 574-575; 591; 614; and 617.

18 T., PP·. 290-292; 295-296; 297; 299; 314-315; 321; 375; 415; 423; 440; 449; 471-472; 495; 581; 590; et. passim.

19 T., (I,iv,2), p. 192.

20 The first noticeable change may be discerned at p. 285f; d. pp. 289; 297; 299; and 385.

21 (III,i,2), p. 472, my emphasis.

22 T., (III,i,2), p. 472.

23 T., (III,iii,1), p. 591.

24 T., (III,i,2), p. 475.

25 T., (III,ii,8), pp. 546–547. Also:” … to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul … is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. Pleasure and pain, therefore are not only the necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence.” (ll,i,8), p. 299. Cf. pp. 291; 471; 582; 590; and (III,i,2) and (III,iii,2), passim.

26 T., pp. 276–277; 302; and 417.

27 T., (III,ii,7), p. 534, my emphasis.

28 T., (III,ii,8), p. 536, my emphasis.

29 T., (II,iii,5), p. 423; d. p. 375.

30 T., (II,iii,3), p. 417.

31 Kydd, Rachel Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise, (london: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 1–40.Google Scholar

32 Smith, Norman Kemp The Philosophy of David Hume,(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 23–47.Google Scholar

33 For such an interpretation, with which I concur for the most part, see Kydd, pp. 111–114 and 132-163. What follows is due in great part to her treatment.

34 T., pp. 419; 423; 534; 536; and, 538.

35 T., (II,iii,4), p. 423.

36 Hume, David An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1957 reprint of the 1777 edition, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 6.Google Scholar

37 T., (III,i,2), p. 472.

38 T., (III,i,2), p. 471.

39 T., (III,ii,2), p. 471, my emphasis.