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Gripped by authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Terry Horgan  and
Mark Timmons
Terry Horgan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Mark Timmons*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
*
thorgan@u.arizona.edu
mtimmons@u.arizona.edu
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Abstract

Moral judgments are typically experienced as being categorically authoritative – i.e. as having a prescriptive force that (i) is motivationally gripping independently of both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires, and (ii) justificationally trumps both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires. We argue that this key feature is best accommodated by the meta-ethical position we call ‘cognitivist expressivism’, which construes moral judgments as sui generis psychological states whose distinctive phenomenological character includes categorical authoritativeness. Traditional versions of expressivism cannot easily accommodate the justificationally trumping aspect of categorical authoritativeness, because they construe moral judgments as fundamentally desire-like. Moral realism cannot easily accommodate the aspect of inherent motivational grip, because realism construes moral judgments as a species of factual belief.

Keywords

Categorical authoritativenessexpressivismmoral judgmentmotivationphenomenology
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 313 - 336
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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