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The problem of empty names and Russellian Plenitude

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Joshua Spencer
Joshua Spencer*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA
*
Email: spence48@uwm.edu
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Abstract

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.

Keywords

Empty namesfictionfictional characterspropositionsRussellianismMillianism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , June 2016 , pp. 387 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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