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Governing Moods: Anxiety, Boredom, and the Ontological Overcoming of Politics in Heidegger

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2008

Jonathan McKenzie*
Affiliation:
Purdue University
*
Jonathan McKenzie, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, 100 N. University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 47907USA, jemckenz@purdue.edu.

Abstract

Abstract. Much recent scholarship explores the consequences of Heidegger's transformation of philosophic thinking for our understanding of political theory at the edge of modernity. In a response to recent readings, this essay argues that the contemporary literature on Heidegger fails to account for two fundamental concerns: the ontic/ontological distinction and the importance of moods, particularly anxiety and boredom. Utilizing these moods, this essay explores the ways in which Heidegger's thought escapes politics through a privileging of the ontological, or object-less, experience, relying on a reclusive reflection as the way to authenticity. Instead of fostering a strong community or strong liberal sense of self, Heidegger leaves us with the nothingness of anxiety and the emptiness of boredom as our alternatives. By transcending the ontic in favor of the ontological, Heidegger divorces himself from politics in the everyday sense and posits an existential response to political theory that is unable to foster authentic collective life.

Résumé. Une part importante de la littérature récente explore les conséquences de la transformation de la pensée philosophique amenée par Heidegger et ses effets sur notre compréhension de la théorie politique à l'aube de l'ère moderne. En réponse à de récentes lectures, cet essai relève deux manquements fondamentaux dans la littérature contemporaine sur Heidegger. Le premier concerne la distinction entre l'ontique et l'ontologique et le deuxième a trait à l'importance des humeurs, plus particulièrement l'anxiété et l'ennui. En explorant ces humeurs, cet essai dévoile les manières dont la pensée de Heidegger échappe à la politique en privilégiant l'expérience ontologique ou immatérielle et en se fondant sur la réflexion recluse, voie qui mène à l'authenticité. Au lieu de favoriser une communauté forte ou un sens profond et libéral de soi, Heidegger nous laisse comme options de rechange le néant de l'anxiété et le vide de l'ennui. En transcendant l'ontique en faveur de l'ontologique, Heidegger se sépare de la politique au sens premier du terme pour donner une réponse existentielle à une théorie politique incapable de forger une vie collective authentique.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2008

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