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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
What might be expected of the Canadian press, and of comment about the Canadian press, in a referendum on Quebec independence? This article does not seek directly to confront that question: it is exclusively about the contribution of the British press to Britain's referendum in June 1975 on her membership in the European Economic Community. Obviously the circumstances of that referendum were quite different from one about Quebec: unlike Premier Lévesque's proposal, for example, it was held across the whole nation, and opinions differed as widely within the parties and their leaderships as between them. But the article's contention—that referenda tend to put in doubt the legitimacy of the press at the same time as giving them an even more central role than in election campaigns—seems applicable to the Canadian situation and perhaps to referenda in general. To draw out the comparison fully, however, would require a familiarity with Quebec politics (and with the precedent of the 1942 conscription plebiscite) that is far beyond this author's competence. This note attempts simply to argue the case by illustration from the isolated British example.
1 The most convenient source for the background, course and consequences of the referendum is Butler, David and Kitzinger, Uwe, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This article draws on work done by the author with the help of Steve McBride and Philip Mogel, for the chapter on the press which he contributed to that book. The themes considered here were touched on only in the last paragraph there.
2 All daily newspapers circulating nationwide were measured for their referendum content in the four weeks between Thursday, May 9, and polling day, Thursday, June 5, inclusive. There was no “official” starting date for the campaign. All referendum content was measured, the basic unit being the column inch. Papers differ in the width of their columns, so strict comparability is possible only in percentage terms. An analysis based on square inches would have standardized totals of space, but varying type faces and sizes mean nothing short of a word count would have provided total comparability of coverage. Due partly to papers' own labelling of their pages, determination of relevance was rarely difficult. The difficult cases were feature articles about European topics which had no direct bearing on EEC affairs but might have been open to construction by readers as indirect attempts to show EEC countries in a good or bad light. For that reason these were included. “Pro” and “anti” EEC matter was allocated according to the declared stance of the writer or speaker reported, or the conclusion reached (in opinion articles). Mr. Benn's speeches thus counted as anti- EEC even though some polling evidence suggested he was counterproductive. The author and two assistants did all the measurement, with regular crosschecking. Sunday papers were excluded from the measurement: they published few numbers during the active part of the campaign. The 17 moming papers and 82 evening papers circulating regionally were also excluded. These have a total circulation of two-thirds of the national dailies. Very few people indeed read one of them without reading a national daily as well. Their salience to the referendum campaign was low.
3 Butler, David and Kavanagh, Dennis, The British General Election of February 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The British General Election of October 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975)Google Scholar.
4 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, 207. Mrs. Hart was “snatched from an express train to Scotland” at London's Euston Station.
5 For example, Butler, David and Pinto-Duchinsky, Michael, The British General Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1971), 137Google Scholar: “Each party tends to campaign on its own self-chosen battleground against straw men of its own devising.”
6 Seymour-Ure, Colin, The Political Impact of Mass Media (London and California: Sage Publications, 1974), 235Google Scholar.
7 The 1975 Referendum, 223.
8 Butler and Kitzinger report that Mr. Benn dominated television coverage, too. He made 52 appearances in feature programmes or as a principal news item between May 1 and June 4. The nearest pro leaders were Mr. Jenkins (27) and Mr. Wilson (25). The nearest Antis were Mr. Powell (23) and Mr. Shore (22). (The 1975 Referendum, 194.)
9 Ibid., 215.
10 Data are not shown here. See Ibid., 226.