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The Response of Canadian Governments to Violence*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Judy Torrance
Judy Torrance
Affiliation:
York University
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Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 473 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1977

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References

1 Janowitz, M., “Patterns of Collective Racial Violence,” in Graham, H. D. and Gurr, T. R. (eds.), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam, 1969), 418–24Google Scholar; Brinton, C. C., The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage, revised, 1965), 86–90, 252–53.Google Scholar

2 The incidents were originally selected for analysis because they seemed to comprise the five most serious challenges to the authority of the federal government. An obvious additional candidate is the FLQ crisis of 1970; it was excluded because the necessary primary sources are not yet open. However, using the seriousness of the incident as the criterion results in a study of the actions of five Conservative or Conservative-dominated coalition governments. The dearth of serious violence during Liberal administrations thus necessarily makes the cases unrepresentative. Perhaps the emphasis of the Liberals under Laurier and Mackenzie King on conciliation and compromise may have been a factor in avoiding the creation of violent confrontations with the government, but the upshot is that we cannot today compare the two parties’ handling of comparably serious violence once it had begun. There are two slight indications that in fact party affiliation is not a significant variable: that is. once confronted with an incident both parties would handle it in a roughly similar manner: first, in the parliamentary debates on the incidents, the opposition Liberals suggested little by way of an alternative “Liberal” way of dealing with violence, but rather concentrated their criticism on the imperfections of Conservative policy which had led up to the violence; and second, what we know of the Liberal government's handling of the FLQ crisis of 1970 is in many respects reminiscent of the way Conservatives have previously dealt with violence. On this latter point, see note 46.

3 In developing the five dimensions of governmental responses, the following provided insights and ideas: Turner, Ralph, “The Public Perception of Protest,” American Sociological Review 34 (1969), 815–31CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; E. Gude, “Batista and Betancourt: Alternate Responses to Violence,” in Graham and Gurr, Violence in America; Bwy, D., “Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin America,” in Masotti, L. H. and Bowen, D. R. (eds), Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1968)Google Scholar; and Calvert, Peter, A Study of Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).Google Scholar A further two dimensions were employed in the dissertation from which this article is drawn—the rigidity or flexibility displayed in a government's response, and the ability or otherwise of a government to handle information available to it without distortion. Beyond finding that Canadian governments have on the whole been flexible in the face of violence and that, with some exceptions, they have handled information appropriately, these dimensions added little to the discussion.

4 White, R. J., Waterloo to Peterloo (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1968). 101.Google Scholar

5 Examples of isolated vendetta cultures are given by Wolfgang, M. E. and Ferracuti, Franco. The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology (London: Tavistock. 1962), 281–82.Google Scholar For an example of outlawry flourishing in isolated regions, see the account of the Ottawa valley in the 1830's in The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The Debate on the Impact of the Canadian Environment, ed. by Cross, Michael (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970), 81, 96–103.Google Scholar

6 United States, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Report (New York: Bantam, 1968), 307–09.Google Scholar

7 Joseph Pope, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (Toronto: Oxford University Press, n.d.). 101. McDougall to Macdonald. 29 October 1869.

8 Stanley, George. The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 306–07.Google Scholar

9 Saskatchewan. Regina Riot Inquiry Commission, Report (Regina. 1936), 1. 193; 11. Appendix. Factum of the Government of Canada. 8–9.Google Scholar

10 Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Papers (1870), No. 12, 32–3Google Scholar, Howe to McDougall, 29 November 1869; Canada, House of Commons, Journals (1874)Google Scholar vol. 8, Appendix 6, 190, Howe to Thibault, 4 December 1869; and 102, deposition of Macdonald.

11 Pope, Correspondence, 341, Macdonald to Dewdney, 29 March 1885; Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Caron Papers, Vol. 11, Caron to Grant, 8 September 1885; Pope, Correspondence, 340, Macdonald to Middleton, 29 March 1885; and 357, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 3 September 1885.

12 Borden, Henry, (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), 786Google Scholar; PAC, Foster Papers, vol. 6, Diary, 29 March 1918.

13 PAC, White Papers, vol. 21, “The Activities of the Citizens’ Committee…,” 17, statement of Robertson to press, 21 June 1919; Bennett in Canada. House of Commons, Debates (24 June 1935), 3900–01.Google Scholar

14 PAC, Meighen Papers, vol. 226A, notes prepared for R. Graham; Debates (24 June 1935), 3900 and (2 July 1935), 4135; Liversedge, Ronald, Recollections of the On to Ottawa Trek: With Documents Relating to the Vancouver Strike and the On to Ottawa Trek. ed. by Hoar, Victor (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 191.Google Scholar Manion to Bennett, 20 June 1935.

15 Sessional Papers (1870). No. 12. 85, Howe to McDougall, 24 December 1869; Debates (26 March 1885). 762; PAC. Borden Papers, vol. 103, Borden to Bourbeau. n.d.; Rowell, in Debates (12 June 1919). 3412Google Scholar; Bennett, in Debates (2 July 1935). 4139.Google Scholar

16 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Rose, 27 November 1869; Debates (2 April 1918). 237; PAC. Meighen Papers, vol. 226A, notes prepared for R. Graham; Saskatchewan. Report. 11. Appendix, Exhibit 45. Bennett to Gardiner. 27 June 1935.

17 Debates (2 April 1918). 237–38.

18 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 109. Campbell, A., In the Case of Louis Riel Convicted of Treason and Executed Therefor, Dated 25 November, 1885 (Ottawa: McLean, Rogers, 1885), 9.Google Scholar

19 Debates (2 July 1935), 4142–43.

20 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Kerr, 23 November 1869; Macdonald, in Debates (26 March 1885), 745Google Scholar and (6 July 1885). 3118; PAC, Borden Papers, vol. 103, Borden to Mewburn and Doherty, 12 April 1918; PAC. White Papers, vol. 21, “The Activities of the Citizens’ Committee,” 17–18, statement of Robertson to press, 21 June 1919; Bennett, in Debates (24 June 1935), 3899.Google Scholar

21 PAC. Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Bown, 14 October 1869; Pope, Correspondence, 313, Macdonald to Aikins, 7 July 1884; PAC, Foster Papers, vol. 7, Diary, 4 April 1918; Borden, Robert Laird Borden, 972; Bennett, in Debates (24 June 1935), 4135.Google Scholar

22 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Kerr, 23 November 1869; Macdonald, in Debates (26 March 1885), 745Google Scholar and (6 July 1885), 3118; Borden, in Debates (2 April 1918), 238Google Scholar; PAC, White Papers, vol. 21, Robertson and Meighen to White, 23 May 1919; Bennett, in Debates (2 July 1935), 4137–38.Google Scholar

23 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 109, Campbell, In the Case of Louis Riel.6; Meighen, in Debates (2 June 1926), 4011Google Scholar; Bennett, in Debates (2 July 1935), 4134.Google Scholar

24 Liversedge. Recollections, 191. Manion to Bennett, 20 June 1935.

25 The government placed high faith in the capacity of the “men of influence,” as they were called (PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Rose, 5 December 1869), to restore calm at Red River. Bishop Taché, for example, is described as a man whose “influence if fully used… will be quite sufficient to put an end to the trouble” (Pope, Correspondence, 121, Macdonald to Rose, 21 January 1870).

26 Lavergne was described as having “such authority over the common people that if he only would he could prevent the mob from gathering” (PAC, Borden Papers, vol. 103, Machin to Minister of Justice, 2 April 1918.

27 Sessional Papers (1870), No. 12, 129, Howe to Bishop Taché, 16 February 1870; PAC, White Papers, vol. 21, “The Activities of the Citizens’ Committee,” 17, statement of Robertson to press, 21 June 1919; Bennett, in Debates (24 June 1935), 3899.Google Scholar

28 According to Howe “the difficulties” in fact originated among the English-speaking population (Debates [21 February 1870], 114); and Cartier referred to the “irritated feelings” existing “amongst the settlers of all creeds and origins” (Journals [1874], 173, Memorandum to Governor General, dated June 8, 1870). The List of Rights drawn up by a convention at Red River were regarded as “reasonable enough” ( Pope, Joseph, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald [Toronto: Durie, 1894], 11, 62Google Scholar, Macdonald to Rose, 11 March 1870).

29 Saskatchewan, Report, 11, Appendix, Interview between a Delegation of Strikers and the Dominion Government, 119–20.

30 Debates (2 June 1926), 4005, Robertson to Council, 25 May 1919.

31 PAC, Foster Papers, vol. 7, Diary, 4 April 1918.

32 PAC, Foster Papers, vol. 8, Diary, 27 June 1919.

33 “The Public Perception of Protest,” 817.

34 The meeting between Machin and Lavergne is shrouded in mystery as the participants offered different accounts of what had taken place. Lavergne thought Machin was acting as Borden's representative; Machin strongly denied this, although possibly in order to spare the government embarrassment. The meeting is described in Provencher, Jean, Québec sous la loi des mesures de guerre, 1918 (Montréal: Editions du Boréal express, 1971), 84ff.Google Scholar

35 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 517, Macdonald to Rose, 11 March 1870; Macdonald in Debates (26 March 1885), 762; PAC, Meighen Papers, vol. 240, Meighen to Ross, 19 July 1946; Bennett, in Debates (2 July 1935), 4133–34.Google Scholar

36 “Every other course should be tried before a resort is had to force. If life were once lost in an encounter between a Canadian force and the inhabitants, the seeds of hostility to Canada and Canadian rule would be sown” (Sessional Papers [1870], No. 12, 143, Report of a Committee of the Honourable the Privy Council, dated 16 December, 1869).

37 Journals (1874), 190, Howe to Thibault, 4 December 1869; Borden, Robert Laird Borden. 788–89; PAC, Borden Papers, vol. 112, Robertson to Borden, 17 June 1919; PAC, Meighen Papers, vol. 30, Memorandum, 22 January 1921; Debates (2 July 1935), 4139.

38 Campbell, , In the Case of Louis Riel…. The Riel Question, letter by the Chapleau, Hon. J.-A. (Ottawa: n.p.. 1885).Google Scholar Both pamphlets may be found in PAC. Macdonald Papers, vol. 109.

39 Cf. Macdonald's serious underestimate of French Canadian reactions to Riel's fate: “The murder of the priests—the incitement of the Indians to murder and pillage, and Riel's abandonment of the faith of his fathers, added to his cowardice, will prevent any anticipated sentiment in his favour” (Pope, Correspondence, 355. Macdonald to Lansdowne, 28 August 1885).

40 Debates (26 March 1885), 762–63.

41 “They [Macdonald and Cartier] said with regard to the popular outcry respecting the death of Scott, that while regretting that event they, as men of business, could pay no attention to it” (Journals [1874], 71, deposition of Ritchot); Debates (5 April 1918), 401; PAC, Meighen Papers, vol. 224, Meighen to Forsey, 4 August 1955.

42 PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, Macdonald to Archibald, 27 October 1869, and Macdonald to Bown, 27 January 1870: PAC, Borden Papers, vol. 103, Borden to Bourbeau, n.d.; Rowell, in Debates (12 June 1919), 3412Google Scholar: Meighen, in Debates (2 June 1919). 3038Google Scholar; Bennett, in Debates (2 July 1935), 4143.Google Scholar Cf. Jill Armstrong's analysis of letters to the editor during the October crisis of 1970. the great majority of which contained a call to stand firm behind the government (“Canadians in Crisis: The Nature and Sources of Support for Leadership in a National Emergency.” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 9 [1972], 306).

43 PAC. White Papers, vol. 21, Meighen and Robertson to White. 23 May 1919; PAC. Borden Papers, vol. 111. Memorandum. 8 July 1919; and vol. 112, Robertson to Borden, 20 June 1919.

44 PAC, Meighten Papers, vol. 226A. notes prepared for R. Graham; and vol. 240, Meighen to Ross, 19 July 1946.

45 PAC, Foster Papers, vol. 7, Diary, 4 April 1918; PAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 107, Macdonald to Jackson, 26 June 1885; and vol. 109, J.-A. Chapleau, The Riel Question, 11.

46 The evidence for the cultural status of these ideas is examined in Torrance, “Cultural Factors,” in particular chaps. 5 and 7. If in fact cultural factors (as opposed to ideological ones) have helped shape governmental responses, this would suggest that we have been dealing with the responses of Canadian governments and not simply the Conservative variety thereof. Turning the argument upside down, we can note the many themes in the Liberal handling of the 1970 crisis apparently similar to previous Conservative policy: for example, the handling of the incident at the heart of the government; the deep concern expressed by government members, particularly that the incident would expand to larger dimensions (“apprehended insurrection”); doubts as to the staunchness of other authorities; the branding of the violent as criminals; the isolation by arrests of potential leaders and the sending into exile of the Cross kidnappers; the use of both violence and diplomacy in the government's response; the absence of changes, including punitive ones (Vallières finds federal employment); the felt need for strong measures to impress both the violent and the country at large; the demand that the country rally around the government, and the impatience at “bleeding hearts.” The recurrence of such behavioural themes under a Liberal government once again suggests that the colour of the party in power is not a significant variable at least in Canada.