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Revolution Revisited: The Structuralist-Voluntarist Debate*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Mehran Kamrava
Mehran Kamrava
Affiliation:
California State University, Northridge
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Abstract

There are three ideal types of revolutions: spontaneous, planned and negotiated. The role and importance of structural factors versus human agency vary according to the general category to which a particular revolution belongs. In spontaneous revolutions, both the transition and conslidation phases are heavily conditioned by prevailing structural factors, especially those that result in the weakening of ruling state institutions and the political mobilization of one or more social groups. By contrast, in planned revolutions self-declared revolutionaries take the lead in both mobilizing supporters and weakening the state, in fact often having a highly elaborate ideological—as well as tactical and strategic—blueprint for the acquisition and consolidation of power. Negotiated revolutions see the greatest coalescence of forces involving both structural developments and human agency. The seeds of the revolution have germinated, but the prevailing structural developments are not by themselves sufficient to bring about the revolution's success. Actors representing both state and society must step in to negotiate, and only then might the revolution succeed and be consolidated.

Résumé

Il existe trois types idéaux de révolution: spontanées, planifiées et négociées. En ce qui concerne les révolutions, le rôle de la prédominance des facteurs structurels par rapport aux facteurs humains varient selon la catégorie générale dans laquelle une révolution particulière s'inscrit. Dans les révolutions spontanées, tant les phases de transition que celles de consolidation sont fortement conditionnées par les facteurs structured prédominants, surtout ceux qui aboutissent à un affaiblissement des institutions en vigueur dans l'État et à la mobilisation politique d'un ou de plusieurs groupes sociaux. En revanche, dans les révolution planifiées, les révolutionnaires déclarés prennent la tête, tant pour mobiliser des adeptes que pour affaiblir l'État, nantis souvent qu'ils sont, d'un plan de crise et de consolidation du pouvoir, qui est à la fois hautement idéologique, aussi bien que tactique et stratégique. Les révolutions négociées sont témoins de la coalescence la plus poussée de forces impliquant les développements structurels aussi bien que les facteurs humains. Les semences de la révolution ont germé, mais les développements structurels prédominants ne suffisent pas en eux-mêmes à faire triompher la révolution. Il faut que d'autres acteurs représentant l'État aussi bien que la société interviennent pour négocier; c'est alors seulement que la révolution a des chances de triompher et de s'installer.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 1999 , pp. 317 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1999

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References

1 Some of these contrary analyses, which originally appeared in the journal Contention, have been published in Keddie, Nikki, ed., Debating Revolutions (New York: New York University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

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3 The planned/spontaneous varieties of revolutions presented here loosely correspond to Huntington's categorization into “Eastern” and “Western” patterns respectively, although they differ from them in important ways as well (Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968], 266–268, 271–74).Google Scholar

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