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‘The Fetishes of So-Called International Bankers’: Central Bank Co-operation for the World Economic Conference, 1932–3*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2008

Patricia Clavin
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Extract

With his sharp denunciation of the ‘old fetishes of so-called international bankers’ for fixed exchange rates on the gold-exchange standard, President Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly consigned the World Economic and Monetary Conference to failure.1 The conference had been convened in June 1933 to tackle the crippling levels of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ economic policies which were strangling the international economy during the Great Depression; its brief was so appealing and its concerns so broad, that sixty-five nations came to London that summer. But from the outset of conference preparations, which began in the autumn of 1932, the issue of central banking co-operation was to highlight many of the difficulties which plagued not only co-operative central bank efforts to revive the international economy but also dilemmas which faced central banks in their relations with their domestic governments.

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Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , November 1992 , pp. 281 - 311
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

1 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931–35 (thereafter FRUS), Vol. 1 (Washington DC: State Department, 1933), 673–4.Google ScholarThe original document was given by the President to FDR jnr; see memorandum by Roosevelt, 3 July 1933, FDR OF: 17, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.Google Scholar

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6 Little has been written on central bank co-operation for the Economic Conference; the best account is in Sayers, Bank, 453–9. Most scholarship has concentrated on governmental monetary policy; for the best published examples see Drummond, I., The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 1931–9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mouré, K., Managing the Franc Poincaré: Economic Understanding and Political Constraint in French Monetary Policy, 1928–36 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nicols, J., ‘Roosevelt's Monetary Diplomacy in 1933’, American Historical Review, No. 56 (Jan. 1951), 295–317CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the most recent account of the ambitions and limitations of central banks in this period, see James, H., Lindgren, H. and Teichova, A. (eds), The Role of Banks in the Interwar Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Home, 1991).Google Scholar

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12 Ibid., 417–18.

13 The Bank also sought Treasury approval for a scheme to repay central bank and government credits to Morgans in New York. Kunz, Battle, 159.

14 Leith-Ross to Warren Fisher, 14 July 1932, T 188'43, Leith-Ross Papers. Leith-Ross even favoured appointing Niemeyer as Britain's representative (not simply adviser) on monetary policy, but this choice was vetoed by the Chancellor. Of delegates appointed to represent their governments, only two were employees of central banks: J. A. Trip, President of the Preparatory Commission, who was President of the Bank of the Netherlands; and H. W. Vocke, the German representative on monetary issues, who was a member of the board of directors at the Reichsbank.Google Scholar

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