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Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University, Denmark
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In a recent paper (2008), I presented two arguments against the thesis that intentional states are essentially normative. In this paper, I defend those arguments from two recent responses, one from Nick Zangwill in his (2010) and one from Daniel Laurier in the present volume, and offer improvements of my arguments in light of Laurier’s criticism.

RÉSUMÉ: Dans un article récent (2008), j’ai présenté deux arguments contre la thèse selon laquelle les états intentionnels sont essentiellement normatifs. Dans cet article, je défends ces arguments contre deux critiques récentes, l’une de Nick Zangwill publiée en 2010 et une autre de Daniel Laurier, dans le présent volume. De plus, je révise mon argument à la lumière des objections de Laurier.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue / Numéro spécial: Normativity: Epistemic, Mental and Moral Aspects / La Normativite : aspects epistemiques, mentaux et moraux , June 2011 , pp. 333 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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