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BonJour’s Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2013

BYEONG D. LEE
BYEONG D. LEE*
Affiliation:
Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea
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Abstract

BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour’s notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called “constitutive awareness of content” from his conception of conscious occurrent belief. But this conception also faces an analogous dilemma with regard to these requirements. Third, his explanatory account faces the problem of representation.

BonJour affirme qu’il a trouvé un moyen de sortir du dilemme sellarsien de la justification non-doxastique. Dans cet article, je soutiens trois thèses afin de montrer que sa solution alléguée échoue. Tout d’abord, il y a deux exigences pour qu’une raison soit bonne, et la notion de prise de conscience non-conceptuelle de l’expérience sensorielle développée par BonJour donne lieu à un dilemme sérieux en ce qui concerne ces exigences. Deuxièmement, il tire son idée de la soi-disant «prise de conscience constitutive du contenu» de sa conception de la croyance consciente et occurrente. Mais cette conception conduit à un dilemme analogue à l’égard de ces exigences. Troisièmement, son explication se heurte au problème de la représentation.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 287 - 304
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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