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Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2013

BYEONG D. LEE*
Affiliation:
Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea

Abstract

The most important challenge to the deflationary views of truth is the success argument. Kitcher defends this argument by demanding that a proper account of successful action should explain why one and the same action can be not only psychologically pertinent but also effectively pertinent, and by arguing that correspondence truth is required to meet this explanatory demand. In this paper, I argue that a proper account of successful action should explain why an agent’s action is an appropriate means to attain his goal, and that a deflationist can meet Kitcher’s explanatory demand by this appropriate-means requirement.

Le défi le plus important auquel doivent faire face les tenants d’une conception déflationniste de la vérité est l’argument de l’action réussie. Celui-ci fut défendu par Kitcher : afin de rendre compte d’une action réussie, il faudrait expliquer pourquoi une et une même action peut être à la fois psychologiquement et effectivement pertinente. Pour lui, seule la vérité-adéquation permet de répondre à cette exigence. Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’afin de rendre compte d’une action réussie, il convient d’expliquer en quoi l’action d’un agent lui est un moyen approprié d’atteindre ses fins, et que cette explication même, dans le cadre d’une conception déflationniste, suffit à répondre à l’exigence théorique de Kitcher.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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