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À la défense du déontologisme doxastique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2009

Daniel Laurier
Daniel Laurier*
Affiliation:
Université de Montréal
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply (i) that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and (ii) that these two sorts of reasons are incommensurable.

RÉSUMÉ : Je réfute l’argument standard selon lequel nous n’avons aucune obligation de croire (ou ne pas croire) quoi que ce soit, parce que nous n’avons pas, sur nos croyances, le genre de contrôle nécessaire pour avoir des obligations. Je propose ensuite une interprétation de la distinction entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques de croire qui est généralisable à d’autres attitudes telles que l’intention et qui semble impliquer (i) que les actes mentaux tels que les jugements et les décisions ne sont jamais des actions intentionnelles et (ii) que ces deux sortes de raisons sont incommensurables.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 37 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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References

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