Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T13:13:06.312Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Les raisons épistémiques sont-elles instrumentales?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2013

DANIEL LAURIER
DANIEL LAURIER*
Affiliation:
Université de Montréal
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In a recent article (2011), Steglich-Petersen claims to be able to provide a teleological account of the nature of epistemic reasons which (i) avoids the standard objections to this kind of approach and (ii) is compatible with the evidentialist claim that epistemic reasons always trump non-epistemic reasons (assuming there are such reasons). I argue that his proposal is unable to do justice to the idea that epistemic reasons are constituted by the evidence, and more generally, that it is incoherent to hold at once that epistemic reasons are instrumental, that believing the true and not believing the false is what has epistemic value and that epistemic reasons are evidential in nature.

Dans un article récent (2011), Steglich-Petersen prétend être en mesure de fournir une explication téléologique de la nature des raisons épistémiques qui (i) échappe aux objections standards soulevées contre ce type d’approche et (ii) soit compatible avec la thèse évidentialiste selon laquelle les raisons épistémiques de croire l’emportent toujours sur les raisons non-épistémiques (à supposer qu’il y ait de telles raisons). Je soutiens que sa proposition est incapable de rendre justice à l’idée selon laquelle les données probantes constituent des raisons épistémiques, et plus généralement, qu’il est incohérent de soutenir à la fois que les raisons épistémiques sont instrumentales, que croire le vrai et ne pas croire le faux possèdent une valeur épistémique et que les données probantes fournissent des raisons épistémiques.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 211 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Adler, Jonathan E. 1999 «The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track», Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 23, no1, p. 267–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alston, William 2005 Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Booth, Anthony Robert 2007 «The Two Faces of Evidentialism», Erkenntnis, vol. 67, no3, p. 401–417.Google Scholar
DeRose, Keith 2000 «Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 60, no3, p. 697–706.Google Scholar
Feldman, Richard 2000 «The Ethics of Belief», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 60, no3, p. 667–695.Google Scholar
Goldman, Alvin 1999 Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Grimm, Stephen R. 2009 «Epistemic Normativity», dans Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan et Pritchard, Duncan, dir., Epistemic Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 243–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Thomas 2003 «Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 66, no3, p. 612–640.Google Scholar
Kelly, Thomas 2007 «Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 75, no2, p. 465–474.Google Scholar
Leite, Adam 2007 «Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 75, no2, p. 456–464.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, Clayton 2011 «Reasons and Belief’s Justification», dans Reisner, Andrew et Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn, dir., Reasons for Belief, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 111–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lockard, Matthew 2013 «Epistemic Instrumentalism», Synthese, vol. 190, no9, p. 1701–1718. Online first, DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9932-6.Google Scholar
Nelson, Mark T. 2010 «We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties», Mind, vol. 119, no473, p. 83–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shah, Nishi 2006 «A New Argument for Evidentialism», The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 56, no225, p. 481–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn 2011 «How to be a Teleologist about Epistemic Reasons», dans Reisner, Andrew et Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn, dir., Reasons for Belief, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 13–33.Google Scholar
Whiting, Daniel 2012 «Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?», Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 93, no2, p. 279–300.Google Scholar